[1] Cottage industry is an industry where the creation of the products and services is home-based instead of factory-based. These products and services tend to be unique and distinctive, but this also makes it hard for the producers to compete with larger factory-based companies. Workers in cottage industries usually work part time from home and usually involve tasks such as sewing, lace-making, and household manufacturing.
[2] Before the Industrial Revolution, business operators would travel around buying materials to deliver to the people who would create the product. They would then collect the goods and sell them or ship them to another market. This type of industry was common when much of the population was engaged in agriculture and provided a source of additional income during the winter months when there was little to no work available for farming. The business operators that helped to facilitate the selling of products are also the ones who helped enable the Industrial Revolution to take place in Western Europe.
[3] The Industrial Revolution was the transition to the new manufacturing processes. During the transitions, production methods changed from items being handmade to being created by machines. New products and production processes were being developed and improved, including the transition from using wood to other bio-fuels to coal. The first type of product to use modern production methods was textiles
[4] The transition from cottage industry to the Industrial Revolution created an unprecedented impact on the overall economy. Some economists, such as Robert E. Lucas, Jr., argue that the true impact of the Industrial Revolution was "for the first time in history, the living standards of the masses of ordinary people have begun to undergo sustained growth…Nothing remotely like this economic behavior is mentioned by the classical economists, even as a theoretical possibility." However, there are others who argue that, even though the economy's overall growth in productive powers was unprecedented, the living standards for the majority of the population did not have significant growth until the late 19th and 20th centuries. In fact, the workers living standards declined under early capitalism: for example, real wages in Britain only increased 15% between the 1780s and 1850s.
[5] Although there is much debate about the official start of the Industrial Revolution among historians, they do agree that it was the most important event in the history of humanity since animals and plants were domesticated. The First Industrial Revolution later evolved into a Second Industrial Revolution with more progress occurring technologically and economically.
Friday, May 20, 2016
Wednesday, May 18, 2016
Cristo e panaceia do amor
Jesus sem dúvida é uma figura que merece triunfar nos pódiums da civilização humana e sobretudo ocidental. A Mitologia cristã enquanto processo terapeutico de amparo psicólogo do indivíduo e das manadas combina tradições locais com a palavra Dele,
Portanto, não se pode culpa-Lo pelo erro de ter por meio de um lunático como Cristo saiu proferindo a palavra Dele. Como se amor e beleza pusessem a mesa.A contradição da visão simplista de um lunático que acreditava no combo (fé + amor) para orientar a vida do individuo, ele deveria ser eliminado e o verdadeiro heroi da visão fé e amor é Judas e não cristo. Judas ao mesmo tempo que calava o lunático que saia falando pelos cotovelos ele também sacrificou esse mesmo lunático que deu todo um Drama perfeito para propulsionar o panaceia do amor cristão.
Certamente, muito ultil para os escravos ou aos que estão prestes a morrer (e que precisam de poder). Pelo fato da narrativa da ressurreição pascoal não ser sustentável o cristianismo exige do individuo a crença o passo no escuro em nome do único, da essencia, nessa operação fradulenta de autodescoberta mediada por cristo.Por outro lado, temos o islã e sua relatividade intransigente em alguns aspectos.A impossibilidade de representar Ele servem para evitar a idolatria, um pecado tão comum entre os infiéis. Diferente da panacéia cristã de o filho Dele perdir misericordia a ignorância humana em sacrificar o filho de deus, no Islã a mensagem do Messias não se confunde com a do profeta. Tal como judaismo e no deus do Antigo testamento fica a eterna pergunta quem criou o criador e quais principios orientam o Pai e não o filho do Pai. Essa desanbiguação entre deus pai e deus filho talvez ajude a libertar das armadilhas e vicios de origem do novo testamento.
, de tão bela e amoroza que virou o inferno de bem intencionados. A modernidade chegou e cristo não mais nos ampara. É importante ter em mente como esse processo a contrução política de cristo, enquanto garantidor de moedas (In God We Trust nos EUA) ou Deus seja Louvado, aqui. Não opera de forma tão simples. Talvez em virtude de suas origens tribais (pior que medievais) eles preservem um senso de conexão que a dentro do aquario da modernidade fica dificil entender.
Será que sob as premissas do Isla, seria possivel existir em Alá we trust. Mas de qqr maneira tem-se o exemplo do Ira, pais mais desenvolvido da regiao, qie adotou Deus na politica apos a Revolução Iraniana.
Portanto, não se pode culpa-Lo pelo erro de ter por meio de um lunático como Cristo saiu proferindo a palavra Dele. Como se amor e beleza pusessem a mesa.A contradição da visão simplista de um lunático que acreditava no combo (fé + amor) para orientar a vida do individuo, ele deveria ser eliminado e o verdadeiro heroi da visão fé e amor é Judas e não cristo. Judas ao mesmo tempo que calava o lunático que saia falando pelos cotovelos ele também sacrificou esse mesmo lunático que deu todo um Drama perfeito para propulsionar o panaceia do amor cristão.
Certamente, muito ultil para os escravos ou aos que estão prestes a morrer (e que precisam de poder). Pelo fato da narrativa da ressurreição pascoal não ser sustentável o cristianismo exige do individuo a crença o passo no escuro em nome do único, da essencia, nessa operação fradulenta de autodescoberta mediada por cristo.Por outro lado, temos o islã e sua relatividade intransigente em alguns aspectos.A impossibilidade de representar Ele servem para evitar a idolatria, um pecado tão comum entre os infiéis. Diferente da panacéia cristã de o filho Dele perdir misericordia a ignorância humana em sacrificar o filho de deus, no Islã a mensagem do Messias não se confunde com a do profeta. Tal como judaismo e no deus do Antigo testamento fica a eterna pergunta quem criou o criador e quais principios orientam o Pai e não o filho do Pai. Essa desanbiguação entre deus pai e deus filho talvez ajude a libertar das armadilhas e vicios de origem do novo testamento.
, de tão bela e amoroza que virou o inferno de bem intencionados. A modernidade chegou e cristo não mais nos ampara. É importante ter em mente como esse processo a contrução política de cristo, enquanto garantidor de moedas (In God We Trust nos EUA) ou Deus seja Louvado, aqui. Não opera de forma tão simples. Talvez em virtude de suas origens tribais (pior que medievais) eles preservem um senso de conexão que a dentro do aquario da modernidade fica dificil entender.
Será que sob as premissas do Isla, seria possivel existir em Alá we trust. Mas de qqr maneira tem-se o exemplo do Ira, pais mais desenvolvido da regiao, qie adotou Deus na politica apos a Revolução Iraniana.
Tuesday, May 10, 2016
Was the First World War caused by inequality?
The 1st WW is usually simply assumed to be caused by imperialist competition, embedded in the domestic economic conditions of the time: very high income and wealth inequality, high savings of the upper classes, insufficient domestic aggregate demand, and the need of capitalists to find profitable uses for surplus savings outside their own country.
In the early twentieth century, finding an external investment outlet for the surplus savings meant being in physical control of a place, and making such investment profitable required that other possible competitors be excluded even at the cost of a war. The “competitive struggle for markets” led to the exploitation of the colonies. A brutal, scramble for new territories took place in Siberia, where Russia expanded eastward, and in the Americas, where the United States expanded westward to annex Mexican territories and southward to reinforce political control. Ghana, Sudan, Vietnam, Algeria, the Philippines, California, and Siberia are all part of the same process.The malign forces that broke the first Kuznets cycle*and set the rich world’s inequality on its downward path for the next seventy years were contained in the unsustainably high domestic inequality that existed before. Linking colonialism to domestic maldistribution of income was made by John Hobson in his book Imperialism: A Study. At its peak, almost half of Britain’s annual savings were invested abroad, implying close to 7% of British national income. Hobson attributed these capital exports to the “surplus savings” of the elites and, by implication, the ‘underconsumption’ of the masses. Lenin adopted a similar argument, but with a small difference (which becomes relevant later). Hobson actually believed British industry ‘overproduced’ and had to sell the ‘surplus’ abroad, and this was the source of the high savings (high profits).
But the reality is that by the 1850s (at least) Britain had a deficit every year in the merchandise trade balance. That goes against the stereotype of Victorian Britain as the “workshop of the world”. Both British India and Egypt (under the British protectorate) exported raw cotton to Britain’s competitors in textile manufacturing such as Germany, France, and later Japan. Japan started industrialisation partly with Indian cotton and, especially after 1918, exported cotton textiles to British India itself. The Government of India built a national railway system ordering only from British suppliers. The import of food and raw materials consistently exceeded British manufactures exports by quite large amounts. As Britain’s comparative advantage moved farther away from manufacturing to services, the shift also implied that financial capitalism was ever more threatened by great power tensions. British bankers, insurers, and shippers facilitated the prodigious expansion of global trade and investment in 1870-1914 and profited from the economic growth of France, Germany, and the United States. After some point “surplus savings” in Europe were generated not through domestic production but through foreign production. Simply put, GDP < GNP. Many UK manufacturers may have feared German trade competition and agitated for protection, much as USA manufacturers reacted to Japanese and later Chinese competition in late 20th century. But the financiers were more powerful.
There truly was global financial integration, and great power rivalries did not necessarily interfere with it. Gunboat diplomacy and “informal empire” on behalf of bond holders. Napoleon III occupied Mexico. Germany blockaded Venezuela, or when the British navy shelled Peru for the same reason dominated throughout the period by Egypt, but this particular jump [between 1892 and 1900] is two‐thirds explained by the mining boom in South Africa. For several decades before the Great War, Britain and France were the chief competitors for colonial possessions, and one of the flashpoints after the British semi-annexation of Egypt in 1882 was over the Nilotic region. Anglo-French tensions were so incendiary they almost went to war during the Fashoda incident (1898). Yet here we have French private investment flowing unceasingly, not to France’s own colonies for the most part, but to the British-controlled parts of Africa. We might even call this the “Fashoda Principle”: politico-military rivalry implied very little about commercial rivalry. Britain dropped its objections to the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, when Germany agreed Britain could control its eastern terminus (again, that Indian paranoia). The anticipated “scramble for China” ended up as the Yangtze Agreement on the open door policy, perhaps the most pristine example of multilateral “free trade imperialism”, with everyone having access to trading and investing in an unpartitioned but prostrate China.
What actually soured Anglo-German relations was that Germany’s naval programme was perceived as an existential threat to an island trading nation. “Most influential Germans believed that their country should secure a large place in the world order” — first and foremost in Europe, secondarily in the rest of the world. Germany’s rulers believed the country’s political standing and national prestige was incommensurate with its sudden and dramatic rise as an economic superpower.
In the early twentieth century, finding an external investment outlet for the surplus savings meant being in physical control of a place, and making such investment profitable required that other possible competitors be excluded even at the cost of a war. The “competitive struggle for markets” led to the exploitation of the colonies. A brutal, scramble for new territories took place in Siberia, where Russia expanded eastward, and in the Americas, where the United States expanded westward to annex Mexican territories and southward to reinforce political control. Ghana, Sudan, Vietnam, Algeria, the Philippines, California, and Siberia are all part of the same process.The malign forces that broke the first Kuznets cycle*and set the rich world’s inequality on its downward path for the next seventy years were contained in the unsustainably high domestic inequality that existed before. Linking colonialism to domestic maldistribution of income was made by John Hobson in his book Imperialism: A Study. At its peak, almost half of Britain’s annual savings were invested abroad, implying close to 7% of British national income. Hobson attributed these capital exports to the “surplus savings” of the elites and, by implication, the ‘underconsumption’ of the masses. Lenin adopted a similar argument, but with a small difference (which becomes relevant later). Hobson actually believed British industry ‘overproduced’ and had to sell the ‘surplus’ abroad, and this was the source of the high savings (high profits).
But the reality is that by the 1850s (at least) Britain had a deficit every year in the merchandise trade balance. That goes against the stereotype of Victorian Britain as the “workshop of the world”. Both British India and Egypt (under the British protectorate) exported raw cotton to Britain’s competitors in textile manufacturing such as Germany, France, and later Japan. Japan started industrialisation partly with Indian cotton and, especially after 1918, exported cotton textiles to British India itself. The Government of India built a national railway system ordering only from British suppliers. The import of food and raw materials consistently exceeded British manufactures exports by quite large amounts. As Britain’s comparative advantage moved farther away from manufacturing to services, the shift also implied that financial capitalism was ever more threatened by great power tensions. British bankers, insurers, and shippers facilitated the prodigious expansion of global trade and investment in 1870-1914 and profited from the economic growth of France, Germany, and the United States. After some point “surplus savings” in Europe were generated not through domestic production but through foreign production. Simply put, GDP < GNP. Many UK manufacturers may have feared German trade competition and agitated for protection, much as USA manufacturers reacted to Japanese and later Chinese competition in late 20th century. But the financiers were more powerful.
There truly was global financial integration, and great power rivalries did not necessarily interfere with it. Gunboat diplomacy and “informal empire” on behalf of bond holders. Napoleon III occupied Mexico. Germany blockaded Venezuela, or when the British navy shelled Peru for the same reason dominated throughout the period by Egypt, but this particular jump [between 1892 and 1900] is two‐thirds explained by the mining boom in South Africa. For several decades before the Great War, Britain and France were the chief competitors for colonial possessions, and one of the flashpoints after the British semi-annexation of Egypt in 1882 was over the Nilotic region. Anglo-French tensions were so incendiary they almost went to war during the Fashoda incident (1898). Yet here we have French private investment flowing unceasingly, not to France’s own colonies for the most part, but to the British-controlled parts of Africa. We might even call this the “Fashoda Principle”: politico-military rivalry implied very little about commercial rivalry. Britain dropped its objections to the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, when Germany agreed Britain could control its eastern terminus (again, that Indian paranoia). The anticipated “scramble for China” ended up as the Yangtze Agreement on the open door policy, perhaps the most pristine example of multilateral “free trade imperialism”, with everyone having access to trading and investing in an unpartitioned but prostrate China.
What actually soured Anglo-German relations was that Germany’s naval programme was perceived as an existential threat to an island trading nation. “Most influential Germans believed that their country should secure a large place in the world order” — first and foremost in Europe, secondarily in the rest of the world. Germany’s rulers believed the country’s political standing and national prestige was incommensurate with its sudden and dramatic rise as an economic superpower.
Resumo de:
https://pseudoerasmus.com/2016/05/08/bm/
* Kuzentz Cycle - is a claimed medium-range economic wave with a period of 15–25 years identified in 1930 by Simon Kuznets.Kuznets connected these waves with demographic processes, in particular with immigrant inflows/outflows and the changes in construction intensity that they caused, that is why he denoted them as “demographic” or “building” cycles/swings. Kuznets swings have been also interpreted as infrastructural investment cycles.
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